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THE LIMITS OF COPYRIGHT: PROPERTY,
PARODY, AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
MARLIN H. SMITH
The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a
reaction; only from this can more complicated forms develop.
Language-I want to say-is a refinement, "in the beginning
was the deed."'
INTRODUCTION
Parody has always enjoyed protection from claims of copyright
infringement, under the doctrine of fair use, but a recent decision
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Rogers v.
Koons,3 drastically narrows this statutory defense4 and threatens
to eclipse the place of parody as fair use. It is not so much the
outcome-a finding that the defendants infringed the plaintiff's
copyright-that is troubling, but rather the court's contradictory
application of the Copyright Act of 19765 (the Copyright Act) to
what would seem to be a clear case of fair use. Under the court's
analysis, commercial parody is infringement per se at the expense
of First Amendment freedoms of speech and the press.
Koons represents a misunderstanding of the purpose and
scope of copyright as a form of property law. The purpose in
1. LUDWIG WITrENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE 31 (G.H. Von Wright ed. &
Peter Winch trans., 1980) (quoting JOHANN W. VON GOETHE, FAUST, Pt. I (In the
Study)).
2. Fair use is a "privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use the copy-
righted material in a reasonable manner without his consent." HORACE G. BALL, LAW
OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944). This common law doctrine was
first codified in the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). See
infra Part III.
3. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
5. Id. §§ 101-810.
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authorizing temporary monopolies in creative works is to create a
sufficient incentive for their production and eventual deposit into
the public domain.6 Because the Copyright Act is a means of
fulfilling the welfare aims of a constitutional provision, judicial
analysis of fair use must be founded on a recognition of the pri-
macy of the public domain.7
It is inevitable that the constitutional privileging of the public
domain results in a restricted scheme of copyright, in light of the
speech character of the property at issue.8 In permitting ownership
of speech in its published form, copyright assigns virtually exclu-
sive rights to that speech against non-owners, and herein lies the
tension between copyright and First Amendment rights. Any re-
gime that seeks to privilege some kinds of speech at the expense
of others is deeply suspect, as the history of British censorship
makes clear." Insofar as copyright constrains the published speech
of non-owners, it is by necessity a uniquely limited form of prop-
erty law.1" Were it otherwise, copyright owners could prohibit
6. Under the Constitution, Congress is authorized "[to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
7. The public domain, which pre-dates the positive law of copyright, justifies the
temporarily exclusive, private rights in intellectual property, since all copyrighted works
will eventually enrich the public domain. See supra note 6. However, the clear language
of the Constitution notwithstanding, works under copyright are often perceived as being
more "valuable" than materials in the public domain because the market pricing of the
former is a familiar measure of worth. But to protect private copyright at the expense of
the public domain could impoverish social discourse, see infra notes 202-06, creating a
dysfunctional system of intellectual property rights:
To characterize the public domain as a quid pro quo for copyright or as
the sphere of insignificant contributions ...is to neglect its central importance
in promoting the enterprise of authorship. The public domain should be under-
stood not as the realm of material that is undeserving of protection, but as a
device that permits the rest of the system to work by leaving the raw material
of authorship available for authors to use.
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 968 (1990).
8. Copyright governs the "Writings" of "Authors." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
Under the Copyright Act, these "works of authorship" are broadly defined as "expressive
works" or published forms of speech. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
9. See David Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REV. 77, 94-95 &
nn.92-100 (1975) (outlining the history of the British Crown's control of speech and press
through licensing and prosecutions for seditious libel).
10. These limitations distinguish copyright from other forms of property, in which
exclusive rights of ownership and use might extend ad infinitum. For example, the Rule
Against Perpetuities notwithstanding, cooperative heirs may sustain a system of wholly
private property for a period of unlimited duration. Even the Takings Clause might be
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others from even speaking about copyrighted works in published
form. Such "fair uses" preserve rights of speech and the press and
are expressly reserved in the Copyright Act for the public do-
main." Copyright must not impinge on the public's First
Amendment rights; it should guard against only that kind of eco-
nomic harm posed by unauthorized copies that seek to replace the
original. 2 In assessing economic harm under the fair use test,
courts should distinguish between a commentary and a functional
equivalent to the original.13
The Koons court ignored these peculiarities of copyright law,
granting broad protection to Rogers's copyright in the photograph
at the expense of Koons's right to comment upon it in a parodic
sculpture.'4 In particular, the court's application of the fair use
test is flawed in its presumption that the Copyright Act affords
protection against any potential economic harm that a parody may
pose to the original. 5 The proper test of economic harm asks
only whether the parody copies so much of the original that it
serves as a replacement for that original. Only if the parody fails
to identify itself as such, or incorporates so much of the original
that it may be used as a substitute, should infringement be found.
This Note is premised on the theory that the temporary na-
ture of copyright and the imperfect protection it affords are not
only an incorporation of First Amendment concerns but also arise
from basic resistance to wholly private ownership of intellectual
property. This resistance derives from the substantive and social
differences between the res of intellectual property and other
forms of property6 and has constitutional, as well as practical
understood as a conversion of one form of private property (land) into another (money)
rather than as the expiration of private property rights. See generally RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY intro, note to Vol. IV 2130-31 (1944) (noting functions of the Rule Against
Perpetuities).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
12. See infra subsection IV(A)(4).
13. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[B]
(1992) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] ("But if regardless of medium, the
defendant's work, although containing substantially similar material, performs a different
function than that of the plaintiffs, the defense of fair use may be invoked.").
14. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 312 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
15. Id.
16. See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges
of Consistency, Consent and Encouragement Theory; 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1378-79
(1989); David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
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and philosophical, dimensions. Koons is an example of the failure
to analyze copyright in light of its limitations.
Part I of this Note outlines the facts and issues of Koons. Part
II provides an overview of copyright as a limited form of property
under both the Copyright Act and the common law, using Koons
to illustrate the statute and the common law doctrines. Part III
analyzes fair use as a major statutory limitation on copyright.
Beginning with a rationale for fair use generally, this Part then
discusses parody as a particular fair use and uses Koons as an
example of the problems in recognizing parody as fair use. Part IV.
explains the four prongs of the statutory fair use test for parody
and their application in Koons. In analyzing the reasoning of
Koons, this Part shows that the court's presumptive rule against
commercial copying is misplaced. It argues that the court's notion
of economic protection under the Copyright Act is overly broad
and compromises the First Amendment rights which the Act was
meant to preserve. The proper test of economic harm is whether
the copy serves to replace the original rather than merely to com-
ment on it. Part V argues that the limitations on copyright should
be preserved in the case of parody because of First Amendment
concerns rather than reliance on an economic rationale. These
First Amendment concerns, incorporated in the Copyright Act, are
consonant with the larger philosophical resistance to copyright as a
form of private property. This Part argues that copyright is instead
a system of gatekeeping, a means of maintaining a degree of pub-
lic access to privately owned works even during their term of
statutory protection. The Note concludes with a summary of the
application of fair use in Koons. This Part argues that the overly
broad interpretation of economic harm is an encroachment on fair
use at the expense of First Amendment rights and the public do-
main. By clarifying the important limitations on the economic
protection afforded copyright owners, the replacement test returns
copyright to its proper role of preserving the public domain and
balancing private property concerns against the public's First
Amendment rights.
Autumn 1981, at 147, 150; Litman, supra note 7, at 971-74.
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I. ROGERS V. KOONS
In Rogers v. Koons,'7 Art Rogers, a professional photogra-
pher, brought an action against sculptor Jeff Koons and the
Sonnabend Gallery, which represented Koons, for copyright in-
fringement and unfair competition in the creation and exhibition
of a sculpture based on a reproduction of Rogers's copyrighted
photograph. In 1980, Mr. and Mrs. Scanlon commissioned Rogers
to make a photograph, subsequently entitled Puppies. The
Scanlons purchased a print for $200, and Rogers retained all rights
to the image. 8 The photograph was exhibited at the San Francis-
co Museum of Modem Art in 1982.'9 In 1984, Rogers licensed
the photograph to Museum Graphics, a commercial publisher, for
reproduction and sale as a greeting card.2'
In 1988, without Rogers's knowledge or permission, Koons
used a greeting card of Puppies to create a painted sculpture enti-
tled String of Puppies. Koons admittedly sent the front of the
greeting card and an enlarged photocopy of Puppies to artisans at
the Demetz Studio in Italy with instructions to create a three-di-
mensional, polychromed wooden sculpture.21 Koons intended that
the sculpture look "just like the photo," albeit with embellishments
such as round, clown-like noses on the blue puppies and daisies in
the hair of the grinning man and woman in the photograph.'
The studio created three copies of String of Puppies from the
artist proof, and the Sonnabend Gallery in New York City exhibit-
ed the sculpture as part of Koons's one-man "Banality Show,"
which opened on November 19, 1988. Koons intended that "the
subject for the show would be Banality but the message would be
a spiritual one. And while being uplifting, the ... work would be
[a] critical commentary on conspicuous consumption, greed, and
self indulgence."' Koons sold the three copies of String of Pup-
pies for a total of $367,000, retaining the artist proof for himself,
and shared the profits equally with Sonnabend. 24 String of Pup-
17. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
18. Id at 304.
19. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 960 F.2d 301 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
20. Koons, 960 F.2d at 304.
21. Ld. at 305. Demetz Studio ordinarily makes sculpture for religious use.
22. Id.
23. Koons, 751 F. Supp. at 475-76 (quoting Defendant's Main Brief).
24. Rogers v. Koons, 777 F. Supp. 1, 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd, 960 F.2d 301 (2d
12371993]
1238 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:1233
pies was subsequently exhibited at the Los Angeles Museum of
Contemporary Art, and Rogers learned of the sculpture when a
photograph of it appeared in the Los Angeles Times on May 7,
1989.25
Rogers, who then registered the photograph Puppies with the
U.S. Copyright Office,' brought an action against both Koons
and Sonnabend Gallery to enjoin the exhibition of String of Pup-
pies and to recover $367,000 in compensatory damages and $2.8
million in punitive damages. The district court granted the injunc-
tion27 and summary judgment for Rogers on the issue of copy-
right infringement but reserved the determination of damages for
trial.' The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the summary judgment against Koons and Sonnabend in all re-
spects, including the order that Koons turn over his artist proof of
the sculpture to Rogers, pursuant to section 503(b) of the Copy-
right Act.29 Pursuant to section 504 of the Copyright Act, the
court of appeals remanded for trial on the issue of damages.'t
Noting that Rogers could claim either actual damages (as well as
apportioned profits)31 or elect statutory damages,32 the court rec-
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
.25. Koons, 960 F.2d at 305.
26. Rogers obtained registration number VA 352/001, effective July 6, 1989, and the
date of first publication was recorded as November 20, 1980. Koons, 751 F. Supp. at 476.
See also infra note 32.
27. The district court originally ordered a permanent injunction against Koons and
Sonnabend, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988), and reserved for trial the issue of
damages because of factual issues in dispute. Koons, 751 F. Supp. at 480. On reargument,
the court found Sonnabend, along with Koons, to be "infringing sellers" for purposes of
money damages. Koons, 777 F. Supp. at 2.
28. Koons, 751 F. Supp. at 481.
29. Although impoundment and disposition of infringing articles is a remedy available
under 17 U.S.C. § 503 (1988), the court did not order the impoundment or destruction of
the three copies of String of Puppies sold to private collectors and did not address the
question of whether these works might resurrect the issue of copyright infringement if
they were to become available for resale.
30. Rogers v. Koons, No. 89-CV-6707-HAIGHT (S.D.N.Y. filed May 14, 1991).
31. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 312 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
Under the Copyright Act, the copyright owner is entitled to recover not only actual dam-
ages suffered as a result of the infringement, but also "any profits of the infringer that
are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the
actual damages." 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1988). The copyright owner need only present
proof of the infringer's gross revenue; the burden is on the infringer to prove any de-
ductible expenses and "elements of profit attributable to factors other than the
copyrighted work." Id. There is no provision for punitive damages under the Copyright
Act.
32. Koons, 960 F.2d at 312. Judge Cardamone overlooked the fact that under the
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ommended "enhanced statutory damages," should Rogers elect the
statutory option, because of Koons's "wilful and egregious behav-
ior.'9
33
II. COPYRIGHT
The analysis of parody as fair use begins with an understand-
ing of the limitations of copyright imposed by the Copyright Act
and the caselaw criteria for copyright eligibility developed in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 4 The statutory
limitations of subject matter, owner's rights, and duration of copy-
right distinguish the protections of copyright from the more expan-
sive protection of tangible property. The judicial gloss on copyright
eligibility-requiring expression, originality, and creativity-further
restrict the scope of copyright. Koons illustrates these limitations.
This Part also lays the foundation for an. argument in favor of an
expansive fair use doctrine in light of the speech character of
parody and the primacy of the public domain.
A. The Copyright Act of 1976
The Copyright Act of 1976 is the latest in a long line of
codifications of the common law of copyright.3 To state a claim
Copyright Act, statutory damages are available for registered works only, 17 U.S.C.
§ 412(2) (1988); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, § 7.16[C], and that Rogers had
not registered Puppies until after discovering String of Puppies. See supra notes 26-27
and accompanying text. The statute is silent on the issue of retroactivity, but should
Rogers be found ineligible for statutory damages, the, amount for all infringements of any
one work shall be "not less than $500 or more than $20,000 as the court considers just."
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). Two or more infringers may be jointly and severally liable. Id.; see
F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228 (1952).
33. Koons, 960 F.2d at 313. Under the Copyright Act, if the copyright owner has
proven willful infringement, the court, in its discretion, may increase the award of statu-
tory damages to a maximum of $100,000. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1988). A reduction of
minimum damages from $500 to $200 is possible only where the infringer "was not aware
and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement." Id.
34. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
35. See infra Part V.
36. Copyright protection existed at common law prior to the drafting of the Con-
stitution. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 407
(Univ. of Chicago ed. 1979). The original Copyright Act of 1790, passed during the sec-
ond session of the First Congress, has been amended more than thirteen times, including
major revisions in 1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976. L. Ray Patterson & David Lange, Fore-
word: A Tribute to Robert W. Kastenmeier, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at
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of infringement under the Act, the plaintiff must prove valid own-
ership of copyright37 and unauthorized copying by the defen-
dant.3" In Koons, the plaintiff's registration of copyright in the
photograph Puppies was sufficient proof of ownership,39 and the
defendant admitted that he had copied the greeting card.'
The subject matter of copyright is limited to "original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression ... from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated."'" "Works of authorship" include the literary, visual, dra-
matic, and performing arts as well as music, film, and architec-
ture.42 Photography and sculpture fall within the category of "pic-
torial, graphic, and sculptural works,,4 3 as well as the narrower
category of "visual arts,"'  to which attach heightened "moral
rights."45 Although the list of statutory subject matter is not
37. Although registration of copyright with the Copyright Office is not required for
effective ownership, 17 U.S.C. § 410 (1988), a certificate of registration is prima facie
evidence of copyright ownership. Id § 410(c).
38. Copying may be proved not only by direct evidence but also by circumstantial
evidence of (1) access to the copyrighted work, and (2) "substantial similarity" between
the works, as judged by the ordinary observer test. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra
note 13, § 13.03[A]; see, e.g., Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1320 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 883 (1989).
The copying need not be deliberate; even unconscious copying may constitute in-
fringement. See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d
Cir. 1983) (finding composer George Harrison's unconscious copying of the song He's So
Fine in writing his own song, My Sweet Lord, to be an infringement).
39. Rogers v. Koans, 751 F. Supp. 474, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), afj'd, 960 F.2d 301 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
40. Koons, 960 F.2d at 305.
41. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
42. Id. § 102(a)(1)-(8).
43. Id. § 102(a)(5). These include "two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of
fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes,
charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1988).
44. A "work of visual art" is a painting, drawing, print, sculpture, or photograph
either existing in a single copy or in a limited edition of no more than 200 copies that
are signed and consecutively numbered by the author. Id.
45. Protection of the author's "moral rights" of attribution and integrity as against
subsequent owners, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (Supp. III 1991), is available only to works of
visual art. See infra note 219 and accompanying text. Thus, the following "pictorial
works," as distinct from visual arts, fall outside the Copyright Act's moral rights protec-
tion:
poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion
picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data
base, electronic information service, electronic publication, . . . [or] any mer-
chandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, or packaging
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meant to be exclusive-in order to anticipate new media--the
Act protects only "works of artistic craftsmanship," not strictly
utilitarian works a7
Copyright protection is further restricted to a set of "exclu-
sive" statutory rights' that permit the owner to reproduce, dis-
play, and distribute copies of the protected work and to "prepare
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work."4 9
Paradigmatic "derivative works"'  include verbatim copies of the
original5' or reproductions of the original in other media,5 2 such
material or container.
Id.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Under the Copyright Act, "works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed," may be eligible for
copyright, and the recognized categories are not limited to those "include[d]" by the
statute. Id. § 102(a). The currently recognized categories are the following: Literary
works; musical works; dramatic works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial,
graphic and sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound record-
ings; and architecture. Id.
47. The category of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" encompasses
works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or
utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article [i.e., "an article
having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the ap-
pearance of the article or to convey information," 17 U.S.C. § 101] shall be
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the ex-
tent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that
can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of,
the utilitarian aspects of the article.
Id. § 101; see, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (sculpture used for lamp base in-
dependently eligible for copyright protection).
48. The "exclusivity" of § 106 implies not only the conventional property right of the
owner to exclude others from using the work, but also a statutory bar to expanding the
rights of the owner. In contrast to the open-ended language of the fair use defense, see
infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text, § 106 enumerates the rights of the owner,
rather than suggesting examples of a broader scope of rights. See supra text accompany-
ing note 49. Its language underscores the primacy of the public domain and the restricted
nature of copyright as a form of property.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
50. The Copyright Act defines "derivative work" as
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musi-
cal arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a
whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
Id § 101.
51. Under the Copyright Act,
"Copies" are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is
fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device. The term "copies" includes the material
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as the photograph of a sculpture, 3 or, as in Koons, a sculpture
made from a photograph. Insofar as the sculpture was found to be
a reproduction of the photograph, Koons's creation, exhibition,
and sale of String of Puppies would presumptively violate Rogers's
rights, unless Koons could demonstrate fair use.5
Copyright is also limited in duration. At some point, the copy-
right expires and the work is ceded to the public domain. For
works created on or after January 1, 1978 (the effective date of
the Copyright Act of '1976), copyright generally "subsists from
[creation of the work] and ... endures for a term consisting of
the [remaining] life of the author and fifty years after the author's
death." 55 This "measuring life" of the author is adjusted for joint
works, anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works for
hire.56
B. The Caselaw Criteria: Copyright Eligibility After Feist
Judicial interpretations of which elements of a particular
"work of authorship" are eligible for copyright add further restric-
tions to the statutory limits on copyright. 7 First, copyright does
not protect ideas but only the expression of ideas in a "tangible
medium of ... embodiment."58 Furthermore, copyright protects
object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.
Id.
52. These include the protected categories of tangible media of expression listed in
§ 102(a) of the Copyright Act. See supra note 42; see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S.
207 (1990) (re-release of film version of short story after expiration of copyright in the
film held to be an infringement of copyright in underlying short story).
53. See, eg., Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago,
320 F. Supp. 1303 (N.D. Il. 1970) (photographs of public sculpture by Picasso held to be
derivative works for purposes of forfeiture and first publication under the common law).
54. See infra Part III.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988). For works created before this date, but not under
copyright on January 1, 1978, copyright subsists from the effective date of the Act and
endures for the remaining life of the author plus fifty years. Id. § 303. For works already
under copyright on January 1, 1978, the two twenty-eight year terms provided under the
Copyright Act of 1909 are harmonized with the new Act such that the total period of
protection runs for seventy-five years from the date the copyright was first secured. Id.
§ 304(a)-(b). See The Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 23-24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81
(1909) (providing one 28 year term with a right of renewal and extension for an addi-
tional 28 years) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)-(b) (1988)).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)-(c) (1988).
57. See supra Section II(A).
58. Under the Copyright Act:
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only that part of the expression which originates with the au-
thor59 and requires at least a modicum of creativity in that origi-
nal expression.60
1. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy. The dichotomy between
"idea" and "expression" is legally tenable if copyright is under-
stood to protect only the tangible, property elements of creative
expressions rather than the intellectual inspiration of producing
them.6i In the landmark case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.,62 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a tele-
phone directory lacked the requisite creativity63 for copyright eli-
gibility. The Court clearly distinguished ideas, which may not be
copyrighted, from their expressions, which are eligible for copy-
right as "works of authorship":
[The] principle, known as the idea/expression or fact/expression
dichotomy, applies to all works of authorship. As applied to a
factual compilation, assuming the absence of original written
expression, only the compiler's selection and arrangement may be
protected; the raw facts may be copied at will. This result is
neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which copy-
right advances the progress of science and art.64
As the Second Circuit recognized in Koons, "ideas, concepts,
and the like found in the common domain are the inheritance of
everyone. What is protected is the original or unique way that an
author expresses those ideas, concepts, principles, or processes." 65
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in
a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated for a period of more than transitory duration.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
59. Feist Publicafions, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1287 (1992); 1
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, § 1.08[C][1].
60. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1294.
61. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or dis-
covery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied
in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). Note that this definition overlaps somewhat
with the artistic/utilitarian distinction in the categories of subject matter eligible for
copyright. See supra note 47.
62. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1992).
63. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
64. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1290 (citations omitted).
65. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
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In Puppies, it was not the idea of the proud couple and their Ger-
man Shepherd puppies that was protectible but "Rogers's expres-
sion of this idea-as caught in the placement, in the particular
light, and in the expressions of the subjects. '
2. Originality and Creativity. Copyright is further limited by
the fact that only that part of the work which originated with the
author-that is, those elements of the work not copied from an-
other or drawn from the public domain-is protectible.67 Tradi-
tionally, "originality" merely distinguished independent effort from
direct copying.6 Since Feist, this term of art now requires at least
a de minimis level of creativity as well.69 The impossibility of de-
fining such terms does not detract from their usefulness in delin-
eating copyright from the public domain. As one commentator has
said, "[o]riginality is a conceit, but we like it."70
With regard to the originality of Puppies, the Koons court
noted that "[e]lements of originality in a photograph may include
posing the subjects, lighting, angle, selection of film and camera,
evoking the desired expression, and almost any other variant in-
volved."'M Although the court found evidence of 'selectivity in
Rogers's production of the photograph,72 it did not point to the
66. Id.
67. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1287; 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, § 1.08[C][1].
68. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951)
(quoting Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer Co., 31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y.
1929)) ("Originality in this context 'means little more than a prohibition of actual copy-
ing.' ").
69. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1294 ("Originality requires only that the author make the
selection or arrangement independently (i.e., without copying that selection or arrange-
ment from another work), and that it display some minimal level of creativity."). For a
thorough explication of the originality and creativity requirements since Feist, see Howard
B. Abrams, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1992, at 3.
70. Litman, supra note 7, at 1019.
71. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir.) (citing Burrow Giles Lithographic
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992); 1 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, § 2.08[E][1].
72. As the court noted,
Substantial creative effort went into both the composition and production of
"Puppies" . . . . At the photo session, and later in his lab, Rogers drew on his
years of artistic development. He selected the light, the location, the bench on
which the Scanlons are seated and the arrangement of the small dogs. He also
made creative judgments concerning technical matters with his camera and the
use of natural light. He prepared a set of "contact sheets," containing 50 differ-
ent images, from which one was selected.
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substantive elements of the work that might bear on its creativity.
Instead, the court cursorily concluded that "Rogers's inventive
efforts in posing the group for the photograph, taking the picture,
and printing 'Puppies' suffices to meet the original work of art
criteria. '
III. FAIR USE
Although the "exclusive rights" afforded by the Copyright Act
permit the copyright owner to effectively exclude some users-and
thus to control some uses of the protected work-these rights are
in no sense absolute.74 Some uses are reserved for the public do-
main under the fair use doctrine 5 regardless of the author's per-
sonal contribution or, economic investment of the owner.76 As
codified in the Copyright Act, this legislative policy choice reflects
the unique legal status of copyright as property. Unlike the owners
of tangible property, owners of intellectual property enjoy only a
Koons, 960 F.2d at 304.
73. ld. at 307.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988); see supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. "The mo-
nopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily de-
signed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which
an important public purpose may be achieved." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). As the Supreme Court explained in Sony,
This protection has never accorded the copyright owner complete control over
all possible uses of his work. Rather, the Copyright Act grants the copyright
holder "exclusive" rights to use and to authorize the use of his work in five
qualified ways, including reproduction of the copyrighted work in copies. All
reproductions of the work, however, are not within the exclusive domain of the
copyright owner, some are in the public domain. Any individual may reproduce
a copyrighted work for a "fair use"; the copyright owner does not possess the
exclusive right to such use.
Ld. at 432-33 (citations omitted).
75. See supra note 2; infra Part IV.
76. Nevertheless, Lockean rationales for private property ownership figure in the
caselaw and the commentary of copyright. See, eg., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (noting that copyright is "designed" to create a
"fair return"); Gordon, supra note 16, at 1446 nn.444-45 (citing, inter alia, JOHN LOCKE,
The Second Treatise of Government § 27, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 283 (Pe-
ter Laslett ed., 1970)) ("For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the
Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at least
where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.") (emphasis omitted).
The Supreme Court has, however, explicitly rejected the notion that the "sweat of
the brow" doctrine alone can justify property ownership. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1296 (1992) (finding telephone directory ineligible for
protection where publisher "expended sufficient effort to make the white pages directory
useful, but insufficient creativity to make it original"). See supra note 69.
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temporary monopoly77 over a much narrower field of "exclusive"
rights.' As the Supreme Court said in Sony Corporation of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,79 in which it found home
videotape recording of copyrighted films to be a fair use,
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly,
like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution,
reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return
for an "author's" creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good. "The sole interest of the United States and the primary
object in conferring the monopoly," this Court has said, "lie in
the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
authors."' 8
The traditional definition of fair use is "a privilege in others
than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without his consent.""1 As long as the charac-
ter of the copying is reasonable and the purpose legitimate, non-
owners may use protected works without the owner's consent or
license. Fair use is an "equitable rule of reason"'  which "permits
courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is de-
signed to foster."' This rule implies that the law is designed to.
encourage not only the creativity of the original authors but cre-
77. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
79. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
80. Id. at 431-32 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,
156 (1975) (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932))).
81. BALL, supra note 2, at 260. That fair use has also been deemed a "right" points
to a persistent ambivalence towards copyright and fair use. In any case, the definition
provides little guidance in determining what constitutes fair use in a particular case. Inso-
far as the right/privilege distinction obtains, this thesis proceeds from the notion that fair
use is founded upon the First Amendment right of speech and publication. See supra
notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
82. Sony, 464 U.S at 448 n.31 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680 ("[S]ince the doctrine is an equita-
ble rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the
question must be decided on its own facts .... )T.
83. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990).
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ativity among all users. In allowing others the limited copying or
use of copyrighted works, fair use strikes a balance between the
"exclusive" rights of owners and the public right of free speech.
As the Second Circuit itself has said,
Whatever aesthetic appeal [a parody] ... may have results from
the creativity that the copyright law is designed to promote. It is
decidedly in the interests of creativity, not piracy, to permit au-
thors to take well-known phrases and fragments from copyrighted
works and add their own contributions of commentary or humor.
After all, any work of sufficient notoriety to be the object of
parody has already secured for its proprietor considerable finan-
cial benefit. According that proprietor further protection against
parody does little to promote creativity, but it places a substan-
tial inhibition upon the creativity of authors adept at using paro-
dy to entertain, inform, or stir public consciousness. 4
A. Parody as Fair Use
Parody, as opposed to other satirical forms, 5 is a comment
made in direct response to the original. Parody must do more than
generate humor; it
must also make some critical comment or statement about the
original work which reflects the original perspective of the paro-
dist-thereby giving the parody social value beyond its entertain-
ment function. Otherwise, any comic use of an existing work
would be protected, removing the "fair" aspect of the "fair use"
84. Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1983)
(footnote omitted).
85. Parody is a "particular kind of satire," and "satire is a potent form of social
commentary which attempts to expose the foibles and follies of society in direct, biting,
critical, and often harsh language-tempered by humor." Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric
Appropriation and the Law of Libe4 Trademark, and Copyright: Remedies Without
Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REV. 923, 924 & n.5 (1985).
Although parody and satire each involve copying, they are distinct in their targets.
In parody, the target of criticism is primarily another creative work and, necessarily, its
formal or aesthetic properties. In satire, the target of criticism is primarily the subject
matter of the original, e.g., an individual or institution which is ridiculed or derided,
"usually with an intent to stimulate change . . . for the purpose of exposing and discred-
iting vice or folly." Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Showcase Atlanta Co-op. Prod., 479 F.
Supp. 351, 357 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (quoting Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cine-
ma, 467 F. Supp. 366, 376 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979)).
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doctrine and negating the underlying purpose of copyright law of
protecting original works from unfair exploitation by others.86
It is the critical force of parody, rather than a "merely... comic
effect,"'  which qualifies it as fair use if all of the statutory fac-
tors are met. Specifically, it is parody's criticism of the expression
of the original that makes parody eligible for protection as fair
use.
The distinction between humor and criticism-between satire
and parody-is crucial to understanding the scope of fair use pro-
tection for parody. Like other paradigmatic fair uses--criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and re-
search'--parody involves social discourse, that is, not just expres-
sion but the exchange of speech. The existence of the original-the
fact that it has "spoken"-becomes the object of the parody and
thus part of its content.8 9 A prohibition of parody in the name of
copyright is thus tantamount to a content-based restriction on
speech. Courts must analyze such restrictions with a heightened
scrutiny not present in the Koons decision.'
In Koons, the court held that "even given that 'String of
Puppies' is a satirical critique of our materialistic society,"'" the
sculpture did not constitute a fair use parody of the original.'
Although the court properly reasoned that the requirement that
parody comment on a particular work93 is a necessary limitation
on fair use copying,94 it used "parody" and "satire" inter-
86. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 479 F. Supp. at 357.
87. New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bartlesman Music Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1517, 1525
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
89. "That is, the first work's prior existence is not merely a convenience that makes
it possible for the later comer to save herself time and effort; rather, the prior existence
of the reproduced work is an essential part of the message that the use seeks to convey."
Wendy . Gordon, Reality as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use, 55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1992, at 93, 97 (footnote omitted).
90. Se4 eg., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 45 (1983)
(noting that content based restrictions on speech must be necessary to serve a compelling
interest and narrowly drawn to acheive that end).
91. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
92. Id.
93. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
94. As the court noted,
It is the rule in this Circuit that though the satire need not be only of the
copied work and may, as appellants urge of "String of Puppies," also be a
parody of modem society, the copied work must be, at least in part, an object
1248 [Vol. 42:1233
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changeably.95 The mistake was not harmless; the court's misinter-
pretation of the distinction led it to discount Koons's arguments
about his larger satirical purpose as insufficient evidence of his
intent to parody the Rogers photograph 97 and to ignore the for-
mal and contextual differences98 between the works which amply
support Koons's claim that String of Puppies is a parody of Pup-
pies. Without considering the relationship among the sculpture, the
photograph, and the exhibition, the court collapsed why Koons
found inspiration in the greeting card-that is, its perceived ba-
nality as a commercial work of art, which could be parodied-with
how Koons used the parody-that is, to satirize a more pervasive
cultural banality.'
Because the copying involved in parody is akin to quoting the
original rather than misappropriating it, the audience must be
aware of the original that the copy parodies. As the court ex-
plained in Koons,
of the parody, otherwise there would be no need to conjure up the original
work.
We think this is a necessary rule, as were it otherwise there would be no
real limitation on the copier's use of another's copyrighted work to make a
statement on some aspect of society at large. If an infringement of copyright-
able expression could be justified as fair use solely on the basis of the
infringer's claim to a higher or different artistic use-without insuring public
awareness of the original work-there would be no practicable boundary to the
fair use defense.
Koons, 960 F.2d at 310 (citations omitted).
95. The court found that Koons's sculpture "is a satire or parody of society at
large." Id. at 309. "[T]hough the satire need not be only of the copied work .... [the
sculpture may] also be a parody of modem society. ... Id. at 310. The court, howev-
er, misused the terms: As parody is a comment upon a particular work, one cannot
"parody" something like "society at large" or "modem society" but may perhaps satirize
that social content of the original. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
96. Koons styles himself to be in the traditions of Cubism, Dadaism (particularly the
"readymades" of Marcel Duchamp), and Pop Art, which often parodied other works for
the purpose of satirizing the rampant consumerism and materialism of modem society.
Koons, 960 F.2d at 304, 309.
97. Id. at 310.
98. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
99. As the court acknowledges,
Koons saw certain criteria in the notecard that he thought made it a workable
source. He believed it to be typical, commonplace and familiar. The notecard
was also similar to other images of people holding animals that Koons had
collected. Thus, he [also] viewed the picture as part of the mass cul-
ture----"resting in the collective sub-consciousness of people regardless of whether
the card had actually ever been seen by such people."
Koons, 960 F.2d at 305 (citation omitted).
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By requiring that the copied work be an object of the parody,
we merely insist that the audience be aware that underlying the
parody there is an original and separate expression, attributable
to a different artist. This awareness may come from the fact that
the copied work is publicly known or because its existence is in
some manner acknowledged by the parodist in connection with
the parody.1°
However, the degree to which Puppies is "publicly known" is a
question of fact, and the analysis in Koons is inconclusive. The
court seemed to confuse public recognition of the work with the
notoriety of its author. Although it found Puppies to be widely
published, if not ubiquitous," 1 the court emphasized instead the
"professional backgrounds"'" and reputations of the artists. Al-
though Rogers was an established professional, he was significantly
less well-known than Koons,"° whom the court described as a
"significant player[] in the art business,"1 " with an international
reputation and six-figure sales prices."05
The conflation of artist and image is commonplace °6 and
100. Id. at 310.
101. After Rogers sold an undetermined number of prints in 1980, Puppies became
part of his professional catalogue and was "used and exhibited a number of times" over
the following years. Id. at 304. These uses included the sale of another signed print to a
private collector, the reproduction of Puppies in an anthology (Dog Days), and the li-
censing of the greeting card to Museum Graphics, which has printed and distributed an
estimated 10,000 copies of Puppies since 1984. Id. Koons himself bought one of the cards
in a "very commercial, tourist-like card shop" in 1987. Id. at 305.
102. Id. at 303.
103. Id. Rogers resides in Point Reyes, California, far from the high-profile New York
art market, and has taught photography, at the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art.
Id. at 303-04. In contrast to Koons's success, Rogers's work is in only three permanent
collections: The San Francisco Museum of Art, the Center for Creative Photography at
the University of Arizona, and Joseph E. Seagrams and Sons in New York City. Al-
though his work has been exhibited in California, Maine, Florida, and New York and
mentioned in various photography publications, there is no evidence that Rogers is partic-
ularly well-known. See id.
104. Id. at 303.
105. The court described Koons as a New York artist with an extensive portfolio
whose "works sell at very substantial prices, over $100,000." Id. at 304. As evidence of
Koons's international reputation, the court cited three galleries which showcased his work
(Sonnabend in New York, Donald Young in Chicago, and Max Hetzler in Cologne, Ger-
many) and his numerous exhibitions in 1980s. Id.
106. As David Lange explained:
We value authorship, or so we say insistently in the main theories of the field.
And yet it appears, again and again, that we merely value some authors, and
then at the expense of others. Eventually, it would seem, we must ask what it
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explains why parody is obvious if the original artist is more fa-
mous than the person parodying his work."W Nevertheless, the
test of recognition concerns the work-the "separate and original
expression"-and requires only that it be attributable to a different
artist, not necessarily one the audience can identify by name. Were
it otherwise, the Koons court would imply that lesser-known or
anonymous artists are exempt from fair use parody.
It is incumbent upon courts to engage in a close reading or
formalist analysis of the works in question in order to gauge the
degree of substantial similarity between them.s While parody
must be substantially similar to the original in order to make its
critical point, it is the play of difference between the original and
its mocking copy which gives the copy the status of parody. The
Koons court, however, gave only brief consideration to the mani-
fest differences between the sculpture and the photograph and
failed to consider the works in their respective contexts of produc-
tion and consumption."
Puppies is a realistic portrait of a proud couple and their pets.
String of Puppies, in contrast, is a garishly painted sculpture fea-
turing clown-nosed, blue dogs and an insipid, smiling couple with
flowers in their hair."0 Furthermore, the parodic elements of the
sculpture are impossible to ignore given the context of the
work-a public exhibition at the Sonnabend Gallery entitled the
"Banality Show.""' It is significant that neither the district court
nor the circuit court ever saw the actual sculpture and relied only
is, exactly, that we prize in authors.
David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of Au-
thorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at
139, 139-43.
107. Consider, for example, Duchamp's painting of da Vinci's Mona Lisa with a
moustache, L.H.O.O.Q.
108. Substantial similarity is "determined by the ordinary observer test," which asks
"whether an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been ap-
propriated from the copyrighted work," Koons, 960 F.2d at 307 (quoting Ideal Toy Corp.
v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966)), or, alternatively, whether "the ordi-
nary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook
them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same." Id. (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc.
v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)).
109. Id. at 308.
110. One viewer described the sculpted couple as "nightmarishly kitsch creatures with
an evil twinkle in their eyes." Martin Gayford, The Arts: Voyage into Outer Taste, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Jan. 9, 1992, at 15.
111. Koons, 960 F.2d at 305.
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a black-and-white photograph of it with the same dimensions as
those of the greeting-card copy of Puppies. Perhaps this explains
the court's emphasis on the similarities of the works rather than
the differences between them that support a finding of parody.
IV. KOONS AS PARODY UNDER THE FAIR USE TEST
From the foregoing analysis of String of Puppies as parody,
we turn to the court's application of each of the statutory fair use
factors. The four pronged test of fair use, codified in section 107
of the Copyright Act, considers the purpose and character of the
unauthorized use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount
and substantiality of the copying, and its economic effect on the
original. In Koons, the court misinterpreted dicta in Sony Corpora-
tion of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.112 as creating a per
se rule against unauthorized copying for commercial purposes. The
court's indiscriminate application of the "economic effect" prong of
the test impermissibly extends copyright protection to any econom-
ic harm resulting from the copy, in contravention to the purpose
of the Copyright Act.
A. The Fair Use Test for Parody
For parody or any other unauthorized copy seeking protection
as fair use, the statutory test requires a case-by-case analysis"' of
statutory factors including:
(1) [T]he purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
112. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
113. "Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the
criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situa-
tions on a case-by-case basis." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, at 65-66
n.10 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680 n.73; see New Line Cinema Corp.
v. Bertlesman Music Group, 693 F. Supp. 1517, 1525 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting Fisher v.
Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986)) ("An assertion of the parody defense 'must be
considered individually, in light of the statutory factors, reason, experience, and, of
course, the general principles developed in past cases.' "); see also 3 NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT, supra note 13, § 13.05[A].
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(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work. 4
The statutory list is not exclusive,11 and although no one ele-
ment is dispositive,"6 the effect on market value is given special
weight. 7 These factors constitute the basis for distinguishing fair
use from infringement."'
The generality of the factors and the self-referential definition
of fair use"9 contribute to an intentionally flexible test."'° The
broad wording anticipates the development of new means of copy-
ing and accommodates the legislative decision to protect from
infringement claims a panoply of categories that typically satisfy
the test for fair use:' criticism and comment, including parody;
news reporting; teaching; scholarship; and research.'2
1. Purpose and Character of the Use. The first prong of the
statutory test considers the purpose for copying a protected work
and the manner of doing so. Because parody is intended to closely
114. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
115. The Copyright Act states that "[t]he -terms 'including' and 'such as' [in the stat-
ute] are illustrative and not limitative." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988); see Harper & Row, Pub-
lishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) ('The factors enumerated in the
section are not meant to be exclusive ... .
116. See supra note 113.
117. Increasingly, effect on market value is treated as the "most important, and in-
deed, central fair use factor." Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990) (quoting 3
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, § 13.05[A]).
118. Section 107 is a mandatory test of fair use. Not only does the plain language of
§ 107 require a consideration of these four factors, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) ("[Ihe fac-
tors to be considered shall include . . ... ") (emphasis added), but the Supreme Court has
explicitly affirmed these requirements. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448-55 (1984).
119. See supra note 2.
120. Congress intended the Copyright Act of 1976 to "restate the present judicial
doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." H.R. REP. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680;
see Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1174
(5th Cir. 1980) ("Congress made clear that it in no way intended to depart from Court-
created principles or to short-circuit further judicial development. ... ).
121. "The statement of the fair use doctrine in § 107 offers some guidance to users in
determining when the principles of the doctrine apply. However, the endless variety of
situations and combinations of circumstances that can rise in particular cases precludes
the formulation of exact rules in the statute." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 5, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680.
122. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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imitate or mimic the language or style of the original "for comic
effect or ridicule," 123 it has a very different purpose from that of
the original. This intent to ridicule the style of the original dis-
tinguishes parody from substantially similar copies that have the
same purpose as the original and function as market substitutes or
replacements.
The first prong of the fair use test also considers the character
of the use, specifically, whether the copy is commercial or educa-
tional in character. Generally speaking, commercial character will
cut against a finding of fair use; copying for non-commercial pur-
poses will not constitute infringement without a likelihood of eco-
nomic harm.1" However, commercial character creates only a re-
buttable presumption against fair use. The legislative history of
section 107 makes clear that the "commercial or non-profit educa-
tional" language is
not intended to be interpreted as any sort of not-for-profit limita-
tion on educational uses of copyrighted works. It is an express
recognition that, as under the present law, the commercial or
non-profit character of an activity, while 'not conclusive with
respect to fair use, can and should be weighed along with other
factors in fair use decisions.12
Indeed, the commercial/non-profit educational dichotomy offers
neither a sufficient justification nor a reliable formula for a finding
of infringement. 2  Given the significance of the economic harm
prong of the fair use test, the commercial character of the copying
123. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Showcase Atlanta Co-op. Prod., 479 F. Supp. 351, 357
(N.D. Ga. 1979) (quoting Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, 467 F. Supp.
366, 376 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979)).
124. In Sony, the court found that,
every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploi-
tation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copy-
right .... A challenge to a non-commercial use of a copyrighted work re-
quires .. . a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that [at least] some
meaningful likelihood of future harm exists. If the intended use is for commer-
cial gain, that likelihood may be presumed. But if it is for a non-commercial
purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
125. Id. at 449 n.32 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5., at 66
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680).
126. Compare Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243
(W.D.N.Y. 1978) (infringement found where government corporation duplicated copy-
righted materials for the poor) with Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796
F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986) (no infringement found where televangelist Jerry Falwell used
copyrighted satirical cartoon from Hustler during televised fundraising campaign).
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should be considered no more than evidence of the copyist's intent
to replace the original."2
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work. The nature of the copy-
righted work provides a counterpoint to the purpose and character
of the unauthorized copy. The nature of the work implies its eligi-
bility for copyright, that is, whether it is a "work of author-
ship"" that meets the requirements of originality and creativi-
ty.' This element of fair use might best be understood as a
depth test, with increasing protection available for more daring
works.
Courts give wider latitude to the fair use of factual works
than fictional ones."3 Since Feist, the factual content of works is
generally ineligible for copyright because it lacks the requisite
"creativity" of individual authorship; only where the arrangement
or expression itself meets the criteria of originality and creativity
will copyright protect such works.13 ' This "thinner" degree of
copyright protection is conconant with a deliberate policy
choice1'3 and an implicit recognition that factual works, like
ideas, are more properly part of the public domain. 33
127. See infra subsection IV(A)(4).
128. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see supra notes 41-42.
129. See infra note 131.
130. See, eg., New Era Publications Int'l v. Carol Publishing Group, 904 F.2d 152, 157
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 921 (1990). The categories of "fact" and "fiction ' are not
fixed but represent a spectrum of fair use protection that varies according to the degree
of originality and creativity involved. As one commentator has explained,
[E]ven within the field of fact works, there are gradations as to the relative
proportion of fact and fancy. One may move from sparsely embellished maps
and directories to elegantly written biography. The extent to which one must
permit expressive language to be copied, in order to assure dissemination of the
underlying facts, will thus vary from case to case and genre to genre.
Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc. 560, 563 (1982).
131. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991); see supra
notes 59-60.
132. "The law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than
works of fiction or fantasy." Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 563 (1985). As the Supreme Court stated in Sony,
[I]t is not true that all copyrights are fungible. Some copyrights govern material
with broad potential secondary markets. Such material may well have a broader
claim to protection because of the greater potential for commercial harm. Copy-
ing a news broadcast may have a stronger claim to fair use than copying a
motion picture. And, of course, not all uses are fungible.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984).
133. In rejecting a Lockean rationale for copyright, the Feist Court elided the distinc-
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3. Amount and Substantiality of Copying. The third prong
of the fair use test measures "the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole."3'
This provision ensures that the copying exceeds a de minimis level
in order to be actionable,13 s and refers to both the amount cop-
ied from the original1" and the quality or value of that copied
portion to the original"w and to the copy itself." Although
tion between the idea/expression dichotomy, supra notes 61-66, and the fact/fiction dichot-
omy:
[C]opyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages
others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work. This
principle, known as the idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy, applies to
all works of authorship. As applied to a factual compilation, assuming the ab-
sence of original written expression, only the compiler's selection and arrange-
ment may be protected; the raw facts may be copied at will.
Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1290 (citations omitted).
However, the two sets of oppositions establish distinct elements of eligibility for
copyright. Whereas an idea lacks the requisite "fixedness" of a "tangible medium of ex-
pression," 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988); see supra note 41, a fact lacks the obvious individual
creativity of fiction. Both ideas and facts are never severed from the commons but reside
in the public domain outside copyright protection. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra
note 13, §§ 2.03[E], 2.11[A].
Whether these dichotomies are analogous or even very useful is subject to debate.
For some commentators, the whole notion of facts being "out there" in the world, to be
discovered rather than created, has been problematic. Gordon, supra note 89, at 94 n.7
(citing Jane Ginsburg, Sabotaging and Reconstructing History: A Comment on the Scope of
Copyright Protection in Works of History After Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 29 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 647, 658 (1982); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectu-
al Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 154-56 nn. 21-22 (1992);
Litman, supra note 7, at 996-97).
134. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1988).
135. "As a rule, a taking is considered de minimis only if it is so meager and frag-
mentary that the average audience would not recognize the appropriation." Fisher v.
Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).
136. "It is certainly not necessary, to constitute an invasion of copyright, that the
whole of a work should be copied, or even a large portion of it, in form or in sub-
stance." Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
137. "The taking is significant not only from a quantitative standpoint but from a
qualitative one as well. The copied passages, if not the 'heart of the [original]' are at
least an important ingredient of [it] as it now stands. To a large extent, they make the
[original] worth reading." Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90, 98-99 (2d Cir.) (quot-
ing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1985) (quot-
ing opinion of the district court, 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1983))), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 890 (1987).
138. The substantiality of the copying is determined in relation to the original as well
as the copy. The Supreme Court has stated:
As the statutory language indicates, a taking may not be excused merely be-
cause it is insubstantial with respect to the infringing work. As Judge Learned
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courts may find it difficult to answer these questions where some-
thing less than verbatim copying is involved, especially given the
relative lack of caselaw on copyright infringement in the visual
arts, substantiality is relevant in determining whether the copy
functions as a replacement of the original under the fourth prong
of the test. 39
The permissible level of copying varies according to the pur-
pose of the copy. Because parody must closely imitate the orig-
inal,"4 courts give it greater latitude than other kinds of fair use
in determining substantiality. Under the common law "conjure up"
test, a parodist may copy enough to evoke the original. 41
Whether this measure is used as a ceiling or a floor,143 courts
Hand cogently remarked, "[N]o plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how
much of his work he did not pirate." Conversely, the fact that a substantial
portion of the infringing work was copied verbatim is evidence of the qualita-
tive value of the copied material, both to the originator and to the plagiarist
who seeks to profit from marketing someone else's copyrighted expression.
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565 (quoting Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81
F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936)).
139. "[A] substantial taking for parody purposes is permissible where, as here, the
parody does not fulfill the demand for the copyrighted work." MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677
F.2d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J., dissenting); see infra notes 150-53 and accom-
panying text.
140. See supra note 85.
141. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) ("A parody is success-
ful only if the audience makes the connection between the original and its comic version.
To 'conjure up' the original work in the audience's mind, the parodist must appropriate a
substantial enough portion of it to evoke recognition."). Other cases that have used the
test include: MCA, 677 F.2d at 184--85; Elsmere Music v. National Broadcasting Co., 623
F.2d 252, 253 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980); Wait Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757-58
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, 329 F.2d
541, 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Showcase
Atlanta Co-op. Prod., 479 F. Supp. 351, 359-60 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Columbia Pictures Corp.
v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 354 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
142. See, e.g., Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 757-58 (finding infringement where parody of
Disney characters could have been achieved with less copying of the original).
143. The "conjure up" test is arguably a threshold for infringement; the copy must at
least "conjure up" the original for an action to survive a motion to dismiss. As the
Second Circuit has said:
[T]he concept of "conjuring up" an original came into the copyright law
not as a limitation on how much of an original may be used, but as a recogni-
tion that a parody frequently needs to be more than a fleeting evocation of an
original in order to make its humorous point. A parody is entitled at' least to
"conjure up" the original. Even more extensive use would still be fair use,
provided the parody builds upon the original, using the original as a known
element of modern culture and contributing something new for humorous effect
or commentary.
Elsmere Music, 623 F.2d at 253 n.1 (citation omitted).
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should apply it in light of "the degree of public recognition of the
original work."1" When the original is not immediately recogniz-
able, more must be copied to invoke it for purposes of parody.
4. Economic Effect of the Copying on the Original. The
fourth prong of the fair use test, the "effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work, 145 is "the
most important, and indeed, central fair use factor."146 Even at
common law, fair use included a consideration of "the degree in
which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work.' ' 47 Since an owner
need not show actual damages to prove copyright infringe-
ment,' 48 the first two common law measures-likelihood of harm
to sales and profits-do not suffice as tests of economic harm.
They are instead evidence of the central issue: Whether the copy
"supersedes" or replaces the original. According to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:
[T]he economic effect of a parody with which we are concerned
is not its potential to destroy or diminish the market for the
original-any bad review can have that effect-but rather wheth-
er it fulfills the demand for the original. Biting criticism suppress-
es demand; copyright infringement usurps it. Thus, infringement
occurs when a parody supplants the original in markets the origi-
nal is aimed at, or in which the original is, or has reasonable
potential to become, commercially valuable.1 49
144. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 439. It is the recognition of the work, not the author, that it
relevant.
145. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988).
146. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990) (quoting 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
supra note 13, § 13.05[A]); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (stating that effect on the market is the most important factor
in determining fair use).
147. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
148. As the Koons court explained, "[T]he owner of a copyright . . . need only dem-
onstrate that if the unauthorized use becomes 'widespread' it would prejudice his poten-
tial market for his work." Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 312 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 365 (1992).
149. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted); see also
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 ("With certain special exceptions . . . a use that sup-
plants any part of the normal market for a copyrighted work would ordinarily be consid-
ered an infringement.") (quoting S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1975)).
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Copyright thus protects the original (and its possible deriva-
tives) against only that unfair competition150 from unauthorized
copies that serve as market substitutes.15 ' Given that parody is a
commentary on the original, only in those rare instances where the
parody replaces the original is there "cognizable economic effect
on the original,"'52 that is, unfair competition amounting to in-
fringement. The measure of whether the copy supersedes the origi-
nal is actually an assessment of whether the parody has crossed
some line in terms of substantiality."' A work intended and in-
terpreted as critical of the original could hardly be said to replace
the original unless it copies so much of the original that one need
not purchase the original in order to own it.
B. Koons and the Fair Use Test
Although the Koons court applied the statutory fair use fac-
tors, it failed to consider how those factors relate to parody as
opposed to other kinds of fair use. This compounds the primary
problem: The court's misinterpretation of copyright as complete
protection against undifferentiated economic harm rather than as a
limited form of protection against the harm posed by replace-
ments.1-4
1. Purpose of the Use. It is fair to say that the defendants
in Koons had mixed motives, that is, they wanted both to contrib-
150. Although the analogy to trademark law is plain, copyright is justified by the
originality and creativity of the expression; trademark is justified by a desire to prevent
consumer confusion. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
151. This is a particularized economic harm that "close substitutes" in the market
pose. A substitute is a "good which can be substituted for another good, or an input
that can be substituted for another input." THE M1T DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOM-
ics 406 (David W. Pearce ed., 3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter MIT DICTIONARY].
152. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438. The court stated that
[a]t the very least, where, as here, it is clear that the parody has neither the
intent nor the effect of fulfilling the demand for the original, and where the
parodist does not appropriate a greater amount of the original work than is
necessary to "recall or conjure up" the object of his satire, a finding of in-
fringement would be improper.
Berlin v. E.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
153. See supra subsection IV(A)(3); see also Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market
Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1640 n.218 (1982) (discussing substantiality).
154. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 312 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
See supra subsection IV(A)(4).
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ute to public edification and enjoyment and to make a handsome
profit in the frenzied art market of the 1980s.155 As the court ac-
knowledged, Koons is both a notorious self-promoter15 6 and an
internationally recognized artist"s in the Pop Art tradition of
Andy Warhol" s and the Dadaism of Marcel Duchamp." 9 The
commercialism of modern culture is in large part the subject mat-
ter of these traditions, which parody cultural icons for satirical
effect. Koons was in effect selling a sculpture that both parodied
the original and satirized its commercialization as a mass-produced
greeting card.
The Koons court's reliance on Sony Corporation of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc."6 for what it considered a sweeping
presumption against commercial copying is misplaced, for Sony
also addresses the issue of the commercial character of the copying
in much more moderate language.161 The court's conclusion in
Koons that the commercial character of String of Puppies is
"[k]nowing exploitation of a copyrighted work for personal gain
[and] militates against a finding of fair use"162 is highly problem-
atic. The court equated the commercial character of the copy with
bad faith on the part of Koons 63 and asserted that by tearing
155. As the Koons court noted, "A New York Times critic complained that 'Koons is
pushing the relationship between art and money so far that everyone involved comes out
looking slightly absurd.'" Koons, 960 F.2d at 304 (citing Michael Brenson, Greed Plus
Glitz, with a Dollop of Innocence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1988, at B41).
156. The court called Koons a "controversial artist hailed by some as a 'modem Mi-
chelangelo,' while others find his art 'truly offensive.'" Ld.
Koons, a Wall Street securities trader-turned-artist, has gained notoriety for such
projects as Made in Heaven, an exhibition of photorealist nude paintings and sculptures
of the artist with his wife Cicciolina (an Italian pornography star and member of parlia-
ment) in flagrante delicto. See Brooke Adams, Jeff Koons at Sonnabend, ART IN AM.,
Mar. 1992, at 117, 117-18.
157. The court noted that Koons had by the time of trial "approximately 100 Group
Exhibitions and ...eleven one-man shows" and was represented by Sonnabend in New
York, as well as the Donald Young Gallery in Chicago and the Galerie Max Hetzler in
Cologne, Germany. Koons, 960 F.2d at 304.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 309.
160. 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (stating "every commercial use of copyrighted material
is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the
owner of the copyright"); see Koons, 960 F.2d at 309, 312.
161. "Copying for commercial gain has a much weaker claim to fair use than copying
for personal enrichment." Sony, 464 U.S. at 455' n.40.
162. Koons, 960 F.2d at 309.
163. The court construed the first prong of fair use as a question of "whether the
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off the Puppies photograph from the greeting card, Koons was
trying to conceal the copyright from Demetz Studio. The assump-
tion that profit-making intent is tantamount to bad faith is un-
founded,'(' and it is difficult to imagine that hired Italian artisans
would respond to an American copyright mark."~ The court's
focus on the copyright mark was symptomatic of its foregone
conclusion that Koons was guilty of "piracy,"" "plagiarism,
' ' 67
and "wilful and egregious behavior.""
Moreover, if the aim of copyright is to guard against unfair
competition, restricting the fair use defense on the basis of the
copyist's intent is not particularly useful.169 The categories of
"commercial" and "non-profit educational" use are neither discrete
nor predictive of economic harm. Non-profit educational copying
could conceivably work greater harm in the market for the original
than copying done for commercial reasons. Consider, for example,
two situations: in one, a professor makes copies of an entire text-
book for his students but makes no profit; in the second, he cre-
ates a companion study guide for the textbook for profit. In the
former situation, there is a clear case of replacement; in the latter,
the unauthorized derivative work may even enhance the market
for the textbook. Just as the non-profit educational character of
the copying should not insulate it against a finding of infringe-
ment, neither should the commercial use of the copy automatically
defeat a defense of fair use.
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work. In Koons, the court
found the original photograph to have "more in common with
fiction than with works based on facts, such as, for example, biog-
raphies7 ' or telephone directories."'' The court did not elabo-
original was copied in good faith to benefit the public or primarily for the commercial
interests of the infringer." Id. (emphasis added). The court concluded that Koons had
acted in "bad faith." Id. at 310.
164. See supra subsection IV(A)(1).
165. The court found that Koons had acted in bad faith based on Koons's commercial
intentions (i.e., the "[k]nowing exploitation of a copyrighted work for personal gain") and
his failure to acknowledge his removal of the back of the Puppies greeting card where
the copyright mark appeared (i.e., the "wrongful denial of exploitative conduct towards
the work of another"). Koons, 960 F.2d at 309.
166. Id. at 303, 311.
167. d. at 303.
168. d. at 313.
169. See supra subsection IV(A)(4).
170. The court may have been referring to Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
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rate on this conclusion, suggesting only that the nature of the
original might be analyzed in terms of whether it is "creative,
imaginative, or represents an investment of time in anticipation of
a financial return."1" As these factors could be applied just as
readily to non-fiction, the finding that Puppies merits the "thicker"
degree of copyright protection appropriate to fictional works limits
the fair use of the photograph without sufficient justification.
3. Amount and Substantiality of Copying. The Koons court
acknowledged that parody is entitled to copy the original more lib-
erally'73 but found that Koons had exceeded a "permissible level
of copying under the fair use doctrine" by copying nearly the en-
tire photograph. 74 By focusing on the common subjects of the
photograph and sculpture, however, the court ignored the differ-
ences in their copyrightable expressions. 75 Although Koons obvi-
ously copied the pose and the portraiture of the Scanlons and
their dogs, these elements did not comprise the whole of the pho-
tograph. The lighting, tonality, and contrast of Puppies are argu-
ably the essential elements of the work and support its eligibility
for copyright. Although it is difficult to quantify such attributes, it
is significant that Koons copied none of these elements in the
polychromed wooden sculpture.
Furthermore, the court's analysis is contradictory; having
found the sculpture satirical but insufficient as a parody of the
Rogers photograph,176 the court nevertheless concluded that
Koons could have parodied the photograph by copying less than
Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (finding infringement where magazine used verbatim quotes
of forthcoming memoir by President Ford) or perhaps to Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342,
348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (finding infringement where biographer of George
Washington used materials from another biography).
171. The court refers to Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct.
1282 (1992) (finding white pages of telephone directory to be ineligible for copyright
because they lack requisite element of creativity).
172. Koons, 960 F.2d at 310 (citing MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir.
1981)).
173. "We have consistently held that a parody entitles its creator under the fair use
doctrine to more extensive use of the copied work than is ordinarily allowed under the
substantial similarity test." Id.; see Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623
F.2d 252, 253 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980).
174. Koons, 960 F.2d at 311.
175. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
176. "[lIt is difficult to discern any parody of the photograph 'Puppies' itself." Koons,
960 F.2d at 310.
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he did.1" It must be noted, however, that although the style of a
famous artist might be "conjured up" with relatively minimal copy-
ing of the original, a much higher level of copying undoubtedly is
required to parody a popular commercial greeting card by a large-
ly unknown photographer. To copy less would be to cast doubt on
the parody .defense and to fall prey to the very charge of "piracy"
that the court levelled at Koons. 7
4. Economic Effect of the Copying on the Original. The
analysis of whether String of Puppies is a replacement of Puppies
and thus competes unfairly in the market for the photograph
should have been simple, yet the court erred in analyzing this
prong of the fair use test. The court's interpretation of copyright
as a prophylactic against the possibility of undifferentiated "eco-
nomic harm" ignored the limitations of the owner's statutory
rights. The court failed to consider the formal differences in the
works and in their respective contexts of consumption. To pur-
chase String of Puppies is not to own the equivalent of a fine art
reproduction of the photograph. The sculpture is not just a rela-
tively faithful copy of Puppies, but a comment on the photograph
as an object of humor and contempt-a burlesque of the proud
couple with their puppies. Moreover, the inclusion of the sculpture
in the "Banality Show" plainly evinces Koons's intent to respond
to the way in which Rogers has commercialized the sentimental
piece in a licensed greeting card. 9
Rogers's copyright in the photograph does not entitle him to
control all reproductions of Puppies"s' but only those that prop-
erly qualify as derivative works. Because String of Puppies com-
ments on the greeting card of Puppies, it stands in a wholly differ-
ent relation to the photograph. Unlike the greeting card, String of
Puppies does not merely expand the market for the photograph; as
speech, it- operates outside the right to derivative works.
177. The photograph was copied "much more than would have been necessary even if
the sculpture had been a parody of plaintiff's work." Id. at 311.
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
180. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432-33
(1984); see also supra note 74.
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Thus, the court's concern that Koons had "exploited" Puppies
without paying the "price" of a license fee was misplaced.' In
light of Koons's treatment of the photograph, it is extremely un-
likely that Rogers would be willing to grant a license to
Koons, 182 an assumption that supports a finding of parody in
String of Puppies. Rather than competing with Puppies in the
market for derivative works, the sculpture serves the very different
purpose of criticism. Insofar as copyright can be analyzed in terms
of markets,s" this is a case of "market failure"'" and qualifies
as fair use on economic, as well as legal, grounds.""
If String of Puppies does indeed pose a threat to Puppies or
its derivative works," it is because of its scornful critique rather
than its attempt at "passing off" as the original. The court erred
181. Koons, 960 F.2d at 312.
182. Being "reluctant to license" copies that criticize their works, copyright owners
have "anti-dissemination motives" with regard to parody. Gordon, supra note 154, at
1632-33; see also Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Parodists will sel-
dom get permission from those whose works are parodied. Self-esteem is seldom strong
enough to permit the granting of permission even in exchange for a reasonable fee ....
The parody defense to copyright infringement exists precisely to make possible a use that
generally cannot be bought.") (citations omitted).
183. See generally Gordon, supra note 153, at 1605-15 (providing an overview of the
market model and arguing for its applicability to the copyright context). Although fair
use requires no economic rationale, see infra notes 209-15, a market-based analysis sup-
ports the legal arguments for parody as fair use in that it shows that if parody has no
price, there may be no market for parody.
184. "Market failure" is "[t]he inability of a system of private markets to provide
certain goods, either at all or at the most desirable or 'optimal' levels." MIT Dicno-
NARY, supra note 151, at 264.
Under the "market failure" theory,
[a]n economic justification for depriving a copyright owner of his market entitle-
ment exists only when the possibility of consensual bargain has broken down in
some way. Only where the desired transfer of resource use is unlikely to take
place spontaneously, or where special circumstances such as market flaws impair
the market's ordinary ability to serve as a measure of how resources should be
allocated, is there an economic need for allowing nonconsensual transfer. Thus,
one of the necessary preconditions for premising fair use on economic grounds
is that market failure must be present.
Gordon, supra note 153, at 1615.
185. "Because the owner's antidissemination motives make licensing unavailable in the
consensual market, and because the free flow of information is at stake, a strong case for
fair use can be advanced in these cases." Gordon, supra note 153, at 1633.
186. As the Koons court noted, "[i]t is obviously not implausible" that String of Pup-
pies has "reduced" the market for licensed sculptural versions of Puppies, just as photo-
graphs of String of Puppies "would prejudice Rogers's potential market for the sale of
the Puppies notecards." Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 312 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 365 (1992).
COPYRIGHT AND PARODY
in its assumption that copyright guards against any use that "un-
dercuts demand" for the original or derivative works." This un-
differentiated notion of economic harm is an overly broad inter-
pretation of that prong of the fair use test and compounds the
court's error in treating the commercial character of the copy as
infringement per se"s without further analysis of evidence to the
contrary.
The court's conclusion that undercutting the demand for the
original "chills creation of such works" was neither an "inevitable
consequence" of unfair copying nor an adequate rationale for
copyright.8 9 One the one hand, it is not difficult to imagine un-
authorized copying which spurs demand for the original but is
nevertheless unfair under the replacement test. On the other hand,
the Copyright Act, through its explicit protection of fair use, en-
courages at least some unauthorized copying. As the Second Cir-
cuit has said, "The 'parody' branch of the -'fair use' doctrine is
itself a means of fostering the creativity protected by the copyright
law. It also balances the public interest in the free flow of ideas
with the copyright holder's [property] interest in the exclusive use
of his work."'"
The rationale for copyright is not just to encourage the pro-
duction of expressive works but "to generate incentives for the
production of works that satisfy consumer tastes."' 9' To the ex-
tent that parody criticizes the original and "reveals [its] flaws," it
is speech and contributes useful information to the public domain.
If consumers find the criticism compelling, "it is appropriate that
demand for the work should decrease."'" Copyright does not
protect against any undercutting of demand by an unauthorized
copy but only against a decrease caused by the replacement or
"substitution" of the original. As one commentator has said,
187. Id.; cf. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that the only
cognizable economic harm from parody is that which "supplants" the original); see supra
note 149 and accompanying text.
188. Koons, 960 F.2d at 312; see supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
189. Koons, 960 F.2d at 312.
190. Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir.
1983).
191. Gordon, supra note 153, at 1633.
192. Id
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"when decreased demand arises out of changed consumer prefer-
ences, that should be reflected in decreased revenues."1"
V. TOWARD AN EXPANSIVE THEORY OF FAIR USE
Koons is significant as a selective interpretation of the Su-
preme Court's dicta on fair use in Sony Corporation of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.,194 an interpretation which departs
from the historical protection of parody195 and reduces the fair
use test to a question of the parodist's commercial motives. As a
result, the Koons analysis sharply narrows the fair use exception
for parody. This near elimination of a statutory fair use defense
contravenes the legislative intent behind the Copyright Act and
compromises the First Amendment rights preserved therein.
Exclusive rights in speech give the copyright holder the legal
power to enjoin others from speaking,1" in contravention to the
privileged place of speech in constitutional law"9 and political
practice."g Furthermore, the question of who owns speech, deter-
mined against the shifting ground of "originality," 199 creates
problems of proof and contradictory notions of exclusivity.t ' Fi-
193. Id. at 1633 n.183.
194. 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 173-74. As the Second Circuit has stated,
as a general proposition, we believe that parody and satire are deserving of
substantial freedom-both as entertainment and as a form of social and literary
criticism. As the readers of Cervantes' Don Quixote and Swift's Gulliver's Trav-
els, or the parodies of a modern master such as Max Beerbohm well know,
many a true word is indeed spoken in jest.
Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822
(1964).
196. Civil infringement of copyright has been described as "actionable on a strict
liability basis." Litman, supra note 7, at 971; see Gordon, supra note 153, at 1390-91.
Statutory remedies include damages and additional profits of the infringer, 17 U.S.C.
§ 504 (1988), the possibility of costs and attorney's fees, id. § 505, and impounding and
disposing of the infringing copies, id. § 506(b).
197. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech .... " U.S.
CoNsT. amend. I.
198. "The fact remains that authorizing speech, historically, has been the work of the
state . . . [a]nd it is for reasons implicit in that larger history that intellectual property
and authorship cannot easily be defended in any society today which prizes freedom of
expression." Lange, supra note 106, at 144.
199. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
200. Independently created works that are, to the observer, identical are nevertheless
independently copyrightable. This contradiction can be understood only if intellectual
property is seen as a means of enjoining a particular behavior-use of copies-rather
than as a means of protecting some unique property. As Judge Learned Hand explained,
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nally, even if speech is justifiably "original" and exclusive use of it
is uncontested, the resistance to complete privatization of intellec-
tual property stems from a foundational notion that speech is not
so much property but social practice.2"'
Even to the extent copyright commodifies speech,' it refus-
es to recognize. the elements of production as wholly private
goods. Copyright is thus a regime of incomplete ownership which
reflects the quasi-property status of expressive works and the pri-
macy of the public domain.' The mythology of artistic creation
aside, writings are produced not from the purely private
imaginings of the author but, to some extent, with materi-
als-signs, images, the formalistic systems of language-from the
public domain. In their transformation into intellectual property,
these materials are never quite removed from the commons but
Borrowed the work must indeed not be, for a plagiarist is not himself pro tanto
an "author"; but if by some magic a man who had never known it were to
compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an "author," and,
if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of
course copy Keats's.
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
669 (1936).
201. Language can be viewed as a reaction to human behavior
"If we want to understand any concept we must obtain a view of the human
behaviour, the activities, the natural expressions, that surround the words for
that concept." The relation between discourse and forms of life is necessary, not
contingent; for Wittgenstein the language of sensation in particular would be
incomprehensible if it were not closely bound up with actual behaviour.
Terry Eagleton, Wittgenstein's Friends, in AGAINST THE GRAIN 106 (1986) (footnote omit-
ted) (quoting Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, reprinted in
WITrGENSTEIN: THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVmESTIATIONS 91-92 (George Pitcher ed., 1968)).
202. The classic critique of private property is the Marxist theory of commodity fetish-
ism:
The commodity is the form products take when [the social] production [of ma-
terial conditions of existence] is organized through exchange .... The com-
modity form of production simultaneously makes private labour social as prod-
ucts are exchanged, and fragments social labour into private labour. This confu-
sion of relations between people with relations to things is the fundamental
contradiction of commodity production. Marx calls it the fetishism of commodi-
ties. ... the process by which the products of human labour come to appear as
an independent and uncontrolled reality apart from other people who have
created them. The historical mission of socialism, in Marx's view, is to tran-
scend not just the contradictions of capitalist production, but the contradictions
of the commodity form on which capitalist production rests.
A DICTIONARY OF MARXIST THOUGHT 86-87 (Tom Bottomore et al. eds., 1983).
203. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
204. "According to the romantic model [of authorship], creative processes are magical
and are, therefore, likely to produce unique expression." Litman, supra note 7, at 1008.
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become at best quasi-public or "mixed" goods, 5 if only because
signification makes no sense outside some social context.2"
Rather than a conventional system of private property owner-
ship, copyright is more properly understood as a system of
gatekeeping, a regime for controlling how and when creative works
are ceded-and elements of production returned-to the public do-
main. An analysis of copyright begins not with the rights of the
author or owner against others, but more properly with public
rights to creative works even as they are protected under copy-
right. Fair use is the repository of public rights in works that are
still under their statutory term of copyright protection. The ratio-'
nale is not so much a forced sharing of works otherwise exclusive-
ly created, and owned as an insistent reminder that creative works
do not arrive sui generis from the depths of the author's imagina-
tion, but are always already imbedded in the social conditions of
production and consumption. Authorship of "original" works is a
legal fiction, albeit a necessary one.' 7 Ownership is the site of
alienable property exchange; fair use is its limit.
Fair use is predicated upon a qualified right to use copyright-
ed works: The right to speak about them but not to duplicate or
replace them with functional substitutes during the term of copy-
right. Fair use is distinguishable from copying generally because its
products do not presume to replace the original so much as to call
attention to its existence and comment on it' ° To allow fair use
205. See infra note 210.
206. Insofar as it is signification, "a system of signs, speech requires the identity of a
speaking subject in a social institution which the subject recognises as the support of its
identity." Julia Kristeva, Signifying Practice and Mode of Production, 1 EDINBURGH '76
MAGAzINE, at 1, quoted in DIcK HEBDIGE, SUBCULTURE: THE MEANING OF STYLE 165
n.6 (Terence Hawkes ed., 1979).
207. "[TMhe requirements of human existence will not suffer the author to die. What
does it matter who is speaking? The answer is-when it is we who are speaking with
those with whom we speak-everything." Lange, supra note 106, at 149-50. Lange ex-
plains that apart from the Foucauldian notion of authorship as "an artifact of authority,"
there is "authorship in the preliminary sense of identifying, merely entre nous, the 'per-
son to whom something owes its origin."' Id. at 148. He argues that this notion is
not only defensible, but inevitable as well .... [Ilt has been an essential re-
quirement of human existence from our earliest beginnings.
Authorship in this original sense situates us in our relationship with oth-
ers, and is therefore the means by which we gauge our place in the world; it is
a necessary antecedent to understanding.
IU
208. All of the statutory examples of fair use-criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, and research-are characterized to some degree by their speech on
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is to ensure that copyright does not encroach unduly on the per-
missible subject matter of speech.
A purely economic rationale' is not a justification for copy-
right; the premise of scarcity is inapt given the relatively unlimited
nature of the goods, their quasi-public status,2 10 and their distinc-
tion from derivative works. 1  Moreover, fairness of use is not a
function of the productive character2' of expressive works but of
the privileged place of speech in constitutional law.2 " The issue
is maintaining enough public access to protected materials in order
to preserve the right to speak about them, regardless of whether it
is efficient to do so.214 The doctrine of fair use guarantees that
copyright protection against a kind of unfair competition will not
compromise public First Amendment rights.215
There remains the problem of what constftutes fair use in a
given situation. The application of the doctrine has proved to be
difficult in practice. When the definition of "Writings" of "Au-
thors' 216 is expansive enough to include conduct protected -as
copyrighted works. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
209. According to Judge Richard Posner.
A use is fair.., when the costs of transacting with the copyright owner over
permission to use the copyrighted work would exceed the benefits of transact-
ing. These benefits include not only . . . economizing on other transactions but
also, and more important, stimulating the production of intellectual property by
enabling its creators to appropriate as private gain the social value of their
creation.
Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 68 (1992).
210. Copyright sustains the status of intellectual property as mixed goods, at once
affording some rights of exclusion to owners but denying them the ability to withdraw
their properties from the public domain entirely.
211. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
212. As the Sony court explained,
[t]he distinction between "productive" and "unproductive" uses may be helpful
in calibrating the balance [between copyright and fair use], but it cannot be
wholly determinative. Although copying to promote a scholarly endeavor cer-
tainly has a stronger claim to fair use than copying [a television program] to
avoid interrupting a poker game, the question is not simply two-dimension-
al. ... The statutory language does not identify any dichotomy between pro-
ductive and nonproductive time-shifting, but does require consideration of the
economic consequences of copying.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455-56 n.40 (1984).
213. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
215. See supra subsection IV(A)(4).
216. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see supra note 6. The term "Writings" is broadly
defined "to include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthet-
ic labor." Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
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"speech," courts may find it difficult to ascertain the degree to
which a copyright owner may enjoin or otherwise penalize the
speech of a non-owner in the name of copyright protection.
The problem is especially acute in the case of fair use criti-
cism or comment,217 of which parody is a particular genre.218
Not only does the copyright owner have an economic incentive to
suppress any criticism which might devalue the work, as an author
he may have a moral investment in the work which suffers from
derogatory comment. Although the Copyright Act is designed to
serve social welfare aims rather than individual "moral rights, 219
217. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see supra text accompanying note 124.
218. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
219. The legislative history on this point is unequivocal:
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the
Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writ-
ings, . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served
and the progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to au-
thors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909) (emphasis added).
However, with U.S. participation in the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Property, Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (Paris revision, July 24,
1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention], American copyright law has been amended to
permit limited protection of the author's "moral rights." As the treaty was not self-exe-
cuting, David Nimmer, Nation, Duration, Violation, Harmonization: An International Copy-
right Proposal for the United States, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 211,
223 n.84, Congress passed the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988), in order to harmonize American copyright law with
international law.
Congress amended the Copyright Act again with the Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified at scattered sections of 17
U.S.C. (Supp. III 1991)). The Visual Artists Rights Act in effect grafted the moral rights
section (i.e., Article 6bis(1)) of the Berne Convention onto the Copyright Act as 17
U.S.C. § 106A (Supp. III 1991), the "Rights of Attribution and Integrity" of creators (not
owners) of visual art. Section 106A provides that for the lifetime of the artist, he
(1) shall have the right-
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of
visual art which he or she did not create;
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of
the work of viiual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modifi-
cation of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputa-
tion ....
Id. § 106A(a).
To these rights protecting against "passing off" or "reverse passing off" are added
the rights protecting against the intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification that
would be prejudicial to the honor or reputation of the artist. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(A). How-
ever, the wording of § 106A does not include protection against "other derogatory ac-
tion" as mentioned in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, supra, a significant omission
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the author may be more motivated to bring an infringement action
on the theory that even speaking about the work in published
form should be a prohibited copying or use of the original.
Copyright law must respond to authors' concerns while both
protecting public speech and encouraging the production of intel-
lectual property and its deposit into the public domain. The man-
agement of these multiple policy objectives demands a theory of
fair use that distinguishes a copy that serves to replace a protected
work from one that simply speaks about it. In the case of parody,
the failure to apply a replacement test threatens to extinguish a
potent form of rebuttal.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Koons, the court substantially narrowed the parody defense
and departed from its precedent of protecting the fair use privilege
of comment and criticism. The result is inconsistent with copyright
jurisprudence and contrary to both congressional intent' and
the goals of copyright law to "stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good""1 and preserve First Amendment rights to
free speech and the press. Although parody is "not ... presump-
tively fair use," it is well established that "[c]opyright is not de-
signed to stifle critics."'
The court's assumption that copyright guards against an undif-
ferentiated notion of. "economic harm" ignored the relationship of
parody to the original and the protection of parody as fair use. In
interpreting Sony as a per se rule against commercial copying, the
Koons court presumed the likelihood of economic harm without
given the status of parody as fair use under American copyright law.
Whether the Copyright Act can in fact be reconciled with European moral rights is
undecided. In any case, neither the moral rights of authors under § 106A nor the eco-
nomic rights of authors and owners under 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) derogates from the
doctrine of fair use codified by 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The statutory
language is unequivocal: "Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 106 and 106A, the fair use
of a copyrighted work ... is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp.
III 1991).
220. See supra note 114; see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985).
221. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984).
222. New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, 693 F. Supp. 1517, 1525
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986)) (finding that
song parody was fair use).
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analyzing whether the statutory test of fair use supports such a
finding. The role of copyright law is better understood as that of a
gatekeeper, controlling access to copyrighted works but guaran-
teeing, via fair use, some measure of availability to the public. In
fact, public access was at the heart of the decision in Sony.'
To construe fair use as a replacement test returns copyright to
its proper focus: The primacy of the public domain and a balanc-
ing of public and private rights given the social nature of speech.
Just as the dichotomies of idea/expression and fact/fiction serve as
markers of what kind of speech may be treated as property, the
replacement test draws a line between fair use and infringement.
As Wendy Gordon has explained, "[W]hen the fact that the first
work exists is an essential prerequisite for the second author's
point to be made, then the special policies in favor of allowing
free use of facts should come into play."' This is an argument
for the expansive test of fair use permitted for factual works as
opposed to fictional ones.
It should not be difficult to distinguish an attempt to replicate
a copyrighted work from an effort to humorously criticize it. The
real issue is whether that criticism or comment also manages to
replace the original. In the case of parody, there is little threat of
chilling the production of original works: What author anticipates
ridicule at the hands of another, or would even be deterred by the
possibility of such criticism? Parody is a protected form of speech
and an independent source of creative production. In order to
preserve a place for parody as fair use, it is imperative to consider
the status of the copy in relation to the original rather than to
assume that commercial purpose poses a threat of cognizable eco-
nomic harm. The issue is not just possible economic harm but the
kind of unfair competition by parody that fails to distinguish itself
as such or otherwise serves as a functional equivalent to the origi-
nal. Absent a finding that the parody is indeed a replacement, it
should enjoy statutory protection as a fair use.
223. The Court cited the opinion of the district court that "public interest in increas-
ing access to television programming [is] an interest that 'is consistent with the First
Amendment policy of providing the fullest possible access to information through the
public airwaves.'" Sony, 464 U.S. at 425 (quoting opinion of the district court, 480 F.
Supp. 429, 454 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
224. Gordon, supra note 89, at 97.
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